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ABSTRACT  
External shocks, such as disease occurrence, can be very disruptive in complex food producing value chains. To 
analyze this,  a vertically linked dynamic partial equilibrium model was used to analyze market  effects of outbreaks 
of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) in The Netherlands. Various shock inducing scenarios were analyzed, e.g 
control strategy, demand shocks and trade bans. The results showed that in densely populated poultry areas (1) 
market effects usually outweigh direct control costs, (2) vaccination could help mitigating total disease costs, 
particularly if (3) channeling to industrial processing is included. Moreover, large, and in some cases opposing 
differences in market effects between the various stakeholders could be observed. The result suggest a number of 
important policy factors that should be considered in HPAI control, e.g. the poultry density, the production 
structure and differentiation of stakeholders, the dependency on international trade and the potential capacity of 
industrial processing of eggs. General implications for other food producing value chains are discussed.  
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1 Introduction 
Today, food is produced in complex supply chains, which include a multitude of stakeholders which are 
vertically interlinked, however each with different features and preferences. External risks, e.g. diseases 
and contaminations, are a continuous thread. In case of occurrence, management and control of these 
risks usually involves measures which affect supply, both between chain levels and overall output of the 
supply chain (see: Longworth et al., 2014ab). Additionally, believes and risk perception, particula rly of 
consumers, will drive (changes in) demand as well. Both contradictory effects usually result in a complex 
set of supply and demand shocks throughout the value chain, which in some occasions and for some 
stakeholders respectively, enhance each other, whereas in other situations they can mitigate each other. 
As a consequence, externally-triggered (disease) shocks can be devastating for the supply chain as a whole 
or for some specific individual stakeholders, whereas other individual stakeholders might (temporarily) 
benefit (Longworth et al., 2018). Hence, understanding this complexity, and awareness of important 
driving factors, is important to improve management of these risks. In turn, such awareness could 
contribute to reducing the impact for the value chain as a whole as well as for individual stakeholders.  
The general aim of this article is to explore and elaborate this value chain problem through an ex ante 
analysis of outbreaks of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) in naïve and non -vaccinated 
populations. These outbreaks usually cause an epidemic spread resulting in large numbers of diseased 
animals, high mortality and other negative production effects (Swayne, 2008). Within the European Union 
(EU), and hence The Netherlands, HPAI control is based on AI Directive 2005/94/EC, which outlines the 
minimum control measures member in the event of an outbreak: culling of infected farms, establishment 
of movement restriction zones (MRZ) and marketing restrictions for poultry and poultry products 
originating from affected areas. Dutch experiences indicate, that, particularly in densely populated poultry 
areas (DPPAs) more stringent measures are required to control the outbreak, such as pre-emptive culling, 
vaccination and restocking restrictions; even then, millions of animals have to be culled (Stegeman et al., 
2004). Moreover, the massive control measures, particularly pre-emptive culling, can have a large impact 
on the entire society (Anonymous, 2004).  
An important choice problem in HPAI control is: control with or without emergency vaccination. Strategies 
based on vaccination are able to control HPAI in DPPAs; this holds also for non -vaccination strategies 
provided they include pre-emptive culling (Marangon and Capua, 2006; Backer et al., 2011; Longworth et 
al., 2014ab). Longworth et al. (2014ab) compared the Direct Costs (DC) and Direct Consequential Costs 
(DCC)1 of both type of strategies, and concluded that non-vaccination strategies that included pre-emptive 
culling outperform vaccination strategies on these two criteria. However, vaccination strategies have a 
better ‘image’ and are more accepted by the general public (Van Asseldonk et al., 2005). The main reason 
of not applying vaccination strategies is that they entail a larger trade risk (i.e. ex port bans), reduced 
producers’ prices, particularly in net-exporting countries, and hence market induced Indirect 
Consequential Costs (ICC) for producers. The latter was demonstrated e.g. for cattle production by 
Berentsen et al. (1992) and for pig production by Mangen and Burrell (2003). Moreover, in most cases ICC 
outweigh DC and DCC (see: Dijkhuizen and Morris, 1997; Saatkamp et al., 2000). Furthermore, economic 
effects are not necessarily distributed evenly between all production chain levels (Gohin and  Rault, 2013; 
Longworth et al., 2018). Hence, a thorough analysis of the market effects of HPAI control strategies and 
ways to mitigate devastating economic impacts is in the interest of veterinary policy makers and all 
production chain participants. 
Regarding the ICC, there exists at least four determining factors related to the behaviour of private actors 
and governments (Longworth et al., 2018): 
− Supply shocks, caused by the disease and the control measures (see: Longworth et al. (2014ab); 
− A temporary reduced demand by (domestic) retail and/or consumers because of fear caused by the 
zoonotic character of HPAI (Flach, 2006); 
− Temporary trade bans can be imposed (Swayne, 2008); within the EU the freedom of member states to 
impose such a ban is limited, hence at first particularly third countries are of interest in this respect; 
− Channeling, i.e. temporary commodity shifts from table eggs to industrial eggs. 
The first three factors have a potential increasing impact on the ICC, whereas the aim of the latter is t o 
reduce these impacts. 
                                                 
1 For a complete overview of costs resulting from epizootic disease outbreaks, their rationale and complexity reference is 
made to Saatkamp et al., 2016. 
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Either single or simultaneous occurrence of these factors will have an impact on market, and hence on the 
producers’ prices and the ICC of the HPAI outbreak. Longworth et al. (2018) described a vertically linked 
dynamic partial equilibrium model capable of analyzing this complex problem for the entire egg 
production chain. The aim of this article is to apply this model to HPAI control in The Netherlands, in order 
to analyze of the impact of the main determining market factors on the ICC of HPAI outbreaks. This could 
be helpful decision support information for disease control authorities and others involved in HPAI 
control. 
2 Material and methods 
2.1 Integrated model structure 
To explore the market effects of HPAI epidemics in the Netherlands, three models are used in an 
integrated manner as shown in Figure 1. Epidemiological outputs for a given control strategy and index 
farm are generated by the simulation model InterSpread Plus parameterized for HPAI epidemics in the 
Netherlands. The epidemiological model is described in Longworth et al. (2013a). The output of the 
epidemiological model is used subsequently as an input for a conversion model, which analyses the 
output and calculates the direct costs and consequential losses for affected farms (see Longworth et al., 
2014b for further details). In addition, the conversion model generates weekly shock parameters for the 
partial equilibrium (PE) model DutchLAY.  
 
Figure 1. Integrated modelling approach to simulate the economic effects of HPAI epidemics in the Netherlands. 
2.2 Multi-level dynamic partial equilibrium model 
Figure 2 provides a stylized representation of the PE-model of the Dutch layer supply chain, covering the 
stages from breeding of parent stock to the consumption of eggs. The supply chain is structured as 
follows: The simplified breeding sector uses feed and reared parent hens to produce hatching eggs 
throughout the production cycle, and spent parent hens for slaughter at the end of the production  cycle. 
Hatcheries use hatching eggs to produce day old chickens at the end of the production cycle. At this level, 
imports and exports of day old chicks take place. Rearing farms use day old chicks and feed to produce 
reared pullets ready for laying (reared layers) at the end of the production cycle.  Layer farms use reared 
layers and feed to produce eggs for consumption throughout the production cycle, and spent hens for 
slaughter at the end of the cycle. Within the model, packing stations are assumed to sort eggs and 
allocate the total supply to either table eggs or industrial eggs so as to maximize revenue. At this level, 
import and export of eggs also takes place. Demand for table eggs is modelled for retail/final consumers 
while intermediate demand for industrial eggs is modelled for the egg product industry.   
All agents are assumed to follow a profit maximization approach, taking into account a production 
technology constraint. The production technologies have a Leontief character, reflecting agronomic  
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relationships between input and output. The various stages of the supply chain are interlinked by markets 
which always clear, but with price signals influencing supply of the upstream and demand of the 
downstream stages. The market for industrial eggs is modelled as a large domestic market with highly 
elastic demand.  Industrial eggs provide a secondary ‘lower value’ market where large quantities of eggs 
can be supplied at a relatively constant price. For a detailed description see Longworth (2018).  
As Figure 2 shows, the model distinguishes between flow variables and stock variables (parent stock, day 
old chickens, reared layers and layers), which is a typical characteristic of animal production. The stock 
variables (and implicitly also output supply) are modelled as a function of lagged dependent variables, 
introducing a partial adjustment mechanism into the model dynamics. This represents physical production 
lags at the individual farm level and gradual adjustment at the aggregate level, since the possib ilities to 
change behaviour are dependent on the stage in the production cycle and are fairly limited except near 
the beginning and end of a production cycle.  
With respect to the closure of the model it should be noted that a  few prices are assumed to be 
exogenous to the model: the price of reared parent hens, spent layer and parent hens, feed, and the price 
of alternative products in the final demand function for eggs. The price of reared parent hens is the input 
price for the simplified breeding sector modelled here. The layer breeding sector is dominated by a few 
breeding organisations that operate internationally with extremely stringent hygiene standards. These 
companies ensure a relatively stable and elastic supply since supply of reared parent hens is  also possible 
via exports and imports of day old chicks and hatching eggs. Given the complexity involved in modelling 
this part of the sector in detail, the price of reared parent hens was kept exogenous and a relatively 
elastic supply of reared parent hens was assumed. The price for spent layer and parent hens is also 
modelled exogenously. These are very low value residual products whose price shows large fluctuations 
even during normal market situations. Finally, also the price of feed is modelled exogenously. In 
production terms, feed for layers is approximately 16 per cent of total feed produced in the Netherlands 
in 2006 (Baltussen and Bolhuis, 2008). The cattle and pig sectors have much larger shares in the feed 
production. Modelling the feed price endogenously would require an extension of the model to other 
livestock sectors in the Netherlands. 
 
Figure 2. Structure of the partial equilibrium model DutchLAY 
Foreign market 
Parent stock 











Stock  Sector participant Flow 
Breeding farm 
Hatching eggs 
Day old chicks 
Reared layers 
Spent hens 
Reared parent hens 
Spent hens 
Consumers  
Egg product industry 
N. Longworth et al. / Int. J. Food System Dynamics 12 (3), 2021, 206-223 
210 
2.3 Modelling shocks associated with the control of HPAI epidemics 
The model incorporates supply shocks, domestic and foreign demand shocks, trade bans and additional 
constraints reflecting potential channelling of poultry and products with a particular status, e.g. poultry 
and products originating from an affected area or vaccinated poultry and products. These shocks enter 
the model either as parameters in the behavioral equations and/or as additional constraints, following 
from trade policy measures that are assumed to overrule demand. 
For table eggs, the model allows for two types of demand shifts, the first relates to the response of 
consumers to a HPAI epidemic (basic demand shock) and is considered to be independent of the control 
strategy, while the second is a specific response to vaccinated products (vaccination demand shock).  
2.4 Scenarios and approach 
An explorative scenario design is used to ensure that scenarios cover the range of potential shocks 
associated with simulated epidemics and that all potentially feasible combinations of different shocks can 
be generated.  
Scenarios are generated from eight different variables (see: Table 1): strategy, density, size, channeling 
policy, basic demand shock, vaccination demand shock, export demand shock and trade ban. The first two 
variables dictate which scenario is implemented in the epidemiological simulation model, the third which 
raw input is generated by the farm level impact or conversion model and used as the base for generating 
the shock variables. The last five variables are constructed in a first processing module in the PE- model of 
the Dutch layer sector, based on the inputs from the farm level impact model. For each scenario, the 
shocks are constructed over time for the relevant products similar as discussed in Longworth (2018).  
Table 1. 
Description of variables used to generate scenarios. 
Variable Options Description Values/action 
Strategy BaseNL 
RV3+1km 
The control strategy used in the epidemiological 
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The analysis is structured as follows: A reference scenario (baseline) is constructed, which reflects the 
normal or default response (culling all animals within a 1 km radius around an infected flock)  to an HPAI 
outbreak in The Netherlands. It is assumed that such an outbreak will most likely take place in a densely 
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populated production area, will be of a medium size, has a length of the epidemic of about four month 
(128 days). For the reference scenario it is assumed that all third countries implement a trade ban lasting 
for one year after the epidemic, but that  there are no domestic demand shocks.  Subsequently four 
groups of scenario’s are simulated and evaluated against the constructed baseline (default response).  The 
scenario’s distinguish themselves from the baseline in four respects: i) the impact of different type of 
outbreaks (with or without additional emergency vaccination), ii) the impact of a trade ban; iii) the impact 
of demand shocks; and iv) the impact of channelling. Whereas ii) and iii) imply changes in the external 
environment (coming from consumers or foreign policy makers), iv) focuses on a particular policy 
response from the domestic authorities, aimed at reducing further harm coming from foreign and 
domestic demand reactions to vaccinated products. 
When comparing the scenario’s the focus is on the economic aspects with the aim to add this as an 
additional dimension in the disease combatting strategy, which often is strongly driven by veterinary 
considerations. The key indicator is then changes in costs and benefits accruing to different stakeholders 
as well as to society as a whole.  These are measured by changes  in consumer surplus and producer 
surplus, properly aggregated over the time period in which the consequences of the disease outbreak are 
felt and have to be dealt with. 
It has been realized that a nearly infinite number of counterfactual scenarios could be chosen to 
demonstrate the impacts. Here a selection has been made of the most relevant epidemic outbreak -
scenario’s. In order to save length, discrete steps with respect to key parameters are taken, rather than 
endless nearly continuous variation in parameters. 
2.5 Epidemiological input for the analysis 
All analyses are based on simulations of HPAI epidemics in The Netherlands, taking account for e.g. 
poultry density of the region and control strategy. Based on Longworth et al. (2014ab) two strategies 
were included: BaseNL, which includes culling within a 1 km radius around an infected flock, and RV3+1km 
which, alongside the culling, includes additional emergency vaccination in a radius of 3 km. Moreover, two 
areas were included: DPPA and sparsely populated poultry area (SPPA). The epidemiological input 
provided by these simulations is presented in Table 2. Only medium (MED) and large (LAR) outbreaks were 
included. 
Table 2. 
Epidemiological characteristics for the scenarios based on strategy, density and size 
Strategy Density Size Epidemic size1 Epidemic length2 Farms in MRZ 
BaseNL DPPA MED 267 128 1,339 
RV3+1km DPPA MED 194 110 1,023 
BaseNL DPPA LAR 371 155 1,514 
RV3+1km DPPA LAR 316 113 1,640 
BaseNL SPPA MED 2 63 93 
RV3+1km SPPA MED 2 63 93 
BaseNL SPPA LAR 15 109 369 
RV3+1km SPPA LAR 10 100 226 
   1. Number of infected farms 
   2. Length of epidemic in days 
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3 Results 
Results are presented as percentage changes from the baseline for a time horizon of three years. The 
simulated epidemic begins on day 1 of this time period, the week in which the outbreak of HPAI is notified 
is an output of the simulated epidemic. 
3.1 Basic scenarios with only supply shocks, compulsory channeling and export bans by third countries 
In the first group of scenarios that were analyzed, only the compulsory channeling measures are applied, 
there are no domestic demand shocks, all third countries implement a trade ban lasting for one year after 
the epidemic. In Table 3, the economic welfare effects, measured in thousand euros, are presented. It can 
be observed that in all cases the loss to producers outweighs and dominates the welfare effect to 
consumers. The total welfare loss to society (resulting from aggregating total consumer surplus CS and 
producer surplus PS) varies from €3 million  (scenario’s 3 and 7) to €68 million (scenario 2). Scenario’s 1, 
2, 5 and 6 imply a net welfare loss to society of  €40 million or more, whereas for scenario’s 3, 4, 7 and 8 it 
is substantially less than €10 million. Note also that relatively low net welfare losses to producers 
correspond with relatively low welfare losses to consumers (see scenario’s 3, 4, 7 and 8).  
Table 3. 
Welfare effects of different HPAI outbreak scenarios for various stakeholder groups involved (thousand euro). 
No. Strategy Density Size CS PS HAT IND LAY PACK PAR REAR 
1 BaseNL DPPA MED -18338  -38865  -4751  -7165  23345  -60472  4177  6000  
2 RV3+1km DPPA MED -14324  -25888  -4309  -3965  25651  -51024  2601  5158  
3 BaseNL DPPA LAR -22189  -45850  -5292  -8373  21017  -71522  3383  14937  
4 RV3+1km DPPA LAR -17220  -38886  -4212  -7095  17116  -56218  3891  7632  
5 BaseNL SPPA MED 12472  -15772  -5559  1223  -30151  28576  -2349  -7511  
6 RV3+1km SPPA MED 12472  -15772  -5559  1223  -30151  28576  -2349  -7511  
7 BaseNL SPPA LAR 10231  -16982  -6065  1145  -21768  20770  -1633  -9429  
8 RV3+1km SPPA LAR 12232  -16157  -5607  935  -30804  29344  -2845  -7180  
Where CS = consumer surplus, PS = aggregate producer surplus, HAT= producer surplus for hatcheries, IND = producer 
surplus for egg product industry, LAY = producer surplus for layer farms, PACK = producer surplus for packing stations, PAR 
= producer surplus for parent farms, REAR = producer surplus for rearing farms. 
 
In Table 4, these effects are presented as percentage deviations in producers and consumer surplus 
compared to the pre disease outbreak level. As the percentage change in total producer surplus indicate 
producers in the laying hen sector can lose on average up to 20% of their profits. However, the lo sses can 
be quite different depending on the stage of the supply chain and to the extent an individual farm is 
affected. As Tables 5 and 6  show producers as an aggregate lose as a result of an epidemic, while 
consumers either gain or lose depending on the location of the epidemic. In the case of an epidemic in a 
SPPA, the supply shift caused by depopulation and restrictions on restocking is smaller than the de mand 
shift from the export ban, resulting in a situation in which prices decrease. This decrease in prices leads to 
a gain for consumers in comparison to the no-epidemic situation. In the case of an epidemic in a DPPA, 
the supply shift appears to dominate the demand shifts, leading to an increase in prices. Although prices 
are generally higher in the DPPA scenarios, aggregate producer surplus is lower suggesting that the 
reduction in production dominates the benefits of higher prices. The welfare effects for the different 
stakeholder groups  for epidemics in a DPPA indicate that for layer farms, parent farms and rearing farms 
the effect of higher prices dominates the loss due to decreased production; leading to an overall gain 
relative to the no-epidemic situation. Hatcheries, packing stations and the egg product industry lose 
relative to the no-epidemic situation. Hatcheries and packing stations are also directly affected by the 
export ban; particularly hatcheries who are more dependent on exports to third countries.  
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The relative gains and losses for the different subsectors are reversed for epidemics in a SPPA, with the 
exception of hatcheries which lose regardless of the location of the epidemic.  
Table 4. 
Percentage change in the net present value of consumer and producer surplus for sector participants for each scenario 
based on strategy and density. 
No. Strategy Density Size CS PS HAT IND LAY PACK PAR REAR 
1 BaseNL DPPA MED -13.92  -16.26  -54.72  -24.21  35.26  -103.78  55.85  8.72  
2 RV3+1km DPPA MED -10.87  -10.83  -49.64  -13.40  38.74  -87.56  34.78  7.49  
3 BaseNL DPPA LAR -16.84  -19.18  -60.95  -28.29  31.74  -122.74  45.23  21.70  
4 RV3+1km DPPA LAR -13.07  -16.27  -48.52  -23.97  25.85  -96.48  52.02  11.09  
5 BaseNL SPPA MED 9.47  -6.60  -64.04  4.13  -45.54  49.04  -31.41  -10.91  
6 RV3+1km SPPA MED 9.47  -6.60  -64.04  4.13  -45.54  49.04  -31.41  -10.91  
7 BaseNL SPPA LAR 7.77  -7.10  -69.86  3.87  -32.88  35.64  -21.83  -13.70  
8 RV3+1km SPPA LAR 9.28  -6.76  -64.59  3.16  -46.53  50.36  -38.04  -10.43  
Where CS = consumer surplus, PS = aggregate producer surplus, HAT= producer surplus for hatcheries, IND = producer 
surplus for egg product industry, LAY = producer surplus for layer farms, PACK = producer surplus for packing stations, PAR 
= producer surplus for parent farms, REAR = producer surplus for rearing farms.  
 
The control strategy chosen has an impact on the welfare of stakeholders since this affects the length and 
size of an epidemic and the distribution of affected farms across the layer production chain. Compar ing 
scenarios 1 and 2 in Table 6 for a medium sized outbreak in a DPPA, suggests that consumers, aggregate 
producers, hatcheries, the egg product industry, layer farms and packing stations were all better off under 
the simulated vaccination strategy (which was shorter, smaller and more evenly distributed); while p arent 
farms and rearing farms were better off under the non-vaccination strategy. The situation is similar for 
large outbreaks in a DPPA, except that layer farms were better off under the no-vaccination strategy and 
parent farms better off under the vaccination strategy. For medium sized epidemics in a SPPA, the chosen 
strategy had no effect on welfare of consumers and producers. Note that for large sized epidemics, most 
stakeholders were better off under the vaccination strategy with the exception of the e gg product 
industry, layer farms and parent farms. Clearly, the differential impacts of epidemics on the welfare of 
consumers and producers is not determined by the size and length of epidemics alone. Interpretation of 
the welfare effects becomes more complex for large epidemics.  
3.2 Effect of trade bans  
In Table 5, for strategy RV3+1km the simulated results for producer and consumer surplus are presented 
for scenarios representing different trade bans (see third column). Other scenario variables, such as  
channeling policy, basic demand shock, vaccination demand shock, and export demand shock were kept 
constant for these simulations. Hence, these scenarios represent situations where there is no demand 
shock (either domestic or export) and therefore the only demand shift is due to the export ban. 
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Table 5. 
Percentage change in the net present value of consumer and producer surplus for sector participants in each trade ban 
scenario for control strategy RV3+1km. 




CS PS HAT IND LAY PACK PAR REAR 
9 SPPA MED 0.66 4.49  -1.78  -23.48  1.62  -24.82  33.22  -18.13  -6.18  
10 SPPA MED 0.33 6.83  -3.58  -41.97  1.85  -35.23  44.17  -28.58  -8.35  
6 SPPA MED 0.00 9.47  -6.60  -64.04  4.13  -45.54  49.04  -31.41  -10.91  
11 DPPA MED 0.66 -8.91  -10.27  -46.17  -28.00  44.15  -54.57  22.64  -16.55  
12 DPPA MED 0.33 -9.13  -10.28  -44.69  -20.33  13.43  -62.41  33.28  14.97  
2 DPPA MED 0.00 -10.87  -10.83  -49.64  -13.40  38.74  -87.56  34.78  7.49  
13 DPPA LAR 0.66 -13.21  -15.95  -43.85  -33.19  -9.08  -88.58  29.85  44.89  
14 DPPA LAR 0.33 -13.29  -16.10  -43.78  -29.25  17.63  -101.52  40.01  26.80  
4 DPPA LAR 0.00 -13.07  -16.27  -48.52  -23.97  25.85  -96.48  52.02  11.09  
Where CS = consumer surplus, PS = aggregate producer surplus, HAT= producer surplus for hatcheries, IND = producer 
surplus for egg product industry, LAY = producer surplus for layer farms, PACK = producer surplus for packing stations, PAR 
= producer surplus for parent farms, REAR = producer surplus for rearing farms.  
1 Percentage of third country exports which follow the EU and do not implement an export ban. 
 
As can be seen from table 5 for epidemics in a SPPA, lower trade bans change the magnitude of the 
gain/loss but do not change which stakeholders gain or lose from an epidemic in relation to the maximum 
trade ban scenario. For epidemics in a SPPA, a lower trade ban (e.g. more countries follow the EU and do 
not implement a trade ban, scenarios 9 and 10) is beneficial for producers as an aggregate but not for 
consumers. A lower trade ban is consistent with a smaller negative demand shift and therefore higher 
prices relative to larger export bans. In this situation, hatcheries, layer farms, parent farms and rearing 
farms all benefit from smaller trade bans, while the packing industry and the egg product industry are 
worse off. This is an expected result for the egg product industry, since this industry is required to pay 
higher prices for industrial eggs. For packing stations the effect is more complex. Under the c urrent model 
assumptions, export bans also affect the foreign price. A smaller export ban is consistent with higher total 
supply in the foreign market and therefore lower foreign prices. Since packing stations export a large 
proportion of table eggs to the EU market, lower foreign prices represent lower revenue for this 
stakeholder and this affect appears to dominate the benefit of higher domestic prices.  
The size of the trade ban turns out to have very little effect on the aggregate consumer and  producer 
surplus for epidemics (both medium and large) in a DPPA. For individual stakeholder groups, the effects of 
lower trade bans do not appear to be linear. This is particularly evident for layer farms, where for a 
medium sized epidemic, the gain is highest under the minimal trade ban scenario (scenario 11) and 
smallest under the 33 per cent trade ban scenario (scenario 12). A large outbreak results in a welfare loss 
for layer farms under the minimal trade ban scenario (scenario 13) and a gain for scenarios whe re the 
trade ban is higher. Although producers as a whole gain from lower trade bans, these effects are minimal 
for outbreaks in a DPPA and disguise complex and conflicting effects for the different producer groups. 
Given the proportion of exports to third countries is much higher for day old chicks, it could be expected 
that the effects of lower trade bans would be more obvious at the level of the hatchery or rear ing farm. 
The results in Table 5 however, suggest that the impact is relatively small for hatcheries but much larger 
for rearing farms.  
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3.3 Effect of demand shocks 
In Table 6, simulated results for producer and consumer surplus are presented for scenarios representing 
different demand shocks. Other scenario variables were kept constant, e.g. density (DPPA), size 
(MEDIUM), channeling policy, basic demand shock (NONE) and trade ban (all third countries imposing a 
trade ban).  
Table 6. 
Percentage change in net present value of consumer and producer surplus for sector participants in each demand shock 
scenario 
No. Basic Vac Export CS PS HAT IND LAY PACK PAR REAR 
2 NONE NONE NONE -10.87  -10.83  -49.64  -13.40  38.74  -87.56  34.78  7.49  
15 MED NONE NONE -12.40  -11.30  -49.65  -12.86  35.31  -85.55  34.33  7.29  
16 MED NONE UNDER -11.56  -11.41  -49.68  -13.33  25.57  -74.61  34.18  7.21  
17 MED NONE SAME -10.78  -11.71  -50.36  -13.61  17.21  -66.53  33.22  7.69  
18 MED NONE OVER -10.18  -12.16  -51.22  -13.25  10.80  -61.78  32.54  8.33  
19 MED SMA NONE -16.50  -12.61  -50.14  -10.41  32.73  -88.19  33.21  6.59  
20 MED SMA UNDER -14.05  -12.91  -58.59  -14.63  3.53  -56.84  20.49  11.34  
21 MED SMA SAME -12.60  -14.86  -59.76  -11.26  -7.10  -50.89  20.16  8.50  
22 MED SMA OVER -11.06  -17.37  -59.44  -7.25  -18.33  -48.13  19.52  6.53  
23 MED MED NONE -22.20  -14.72  -50.93  -7.23  23.78  -86.68  31.92  5.46  
24 MED MED UNDER -18.71  -16.97  -60.21  -7.82  -25.94  -37.50  19.68  6.57  
25 MED MED SAME -17.05  -22.54  -56.60  2.78  -34.90  -47.21  23.01  -1.32  
26 MED MED OVER -16.50  -31.49  -50.22  16.71  -39.01  -85.80  17.01  -1.93  
Where CS = consumer surplus, PS = aggregate producer surplus, HAT= producer surplus for hatcheries, IND = producer 
surplus for egg product industry, LAY = producer surplus for layer farms, PACK = producer surplus for packing stations, PAR 
= producer surplus for parent farms, REAR = producer surplus for rearing farms.  
 
Scenarios 15-18 represent situations where there is anegative domestic demand shock of 20 per cent of 
the initial demand in response to the HPAI epidemic but no consumer response to vaccination.  As the 
export demand shock increases, the loss in consumer surplus decreases and the loss in aggregate 
producer surplus increases. As the export demand shock increases, layer farms suffer the most while  
packing stations gain the most. As expected, if the demand shock is attributable to domestic demand then 
consumers lose (comparing scenarios 2, 19 and 23) while if the demand shock is attributable to export 
demand then consumers gain in response to lower prices. Under the different demand shock scenarios, 
the distribution of stakeholders who win or lose as a result of a HPAI epidemic generally remains the same 
as for scenarios where no demand shock occurs. The exception is for larger demand shocks. For the se 
scenarios (scenarios 21-22,24-26) layer farms and sometimes also rearing farms lose as a result of the 
epidemic. Comparing Tables 6 and 5 it becomes clear that the impact of demand shock can have serious 
consequences for the producers: in the worst case analysed (Table 6, scenario 26) producers together 
loose nearly one third of their surplus which is about double the amount of all third countries imposing a 
trade ban (Table 5, scenario 4). In monetary terms (not reported in the Table) in scenario 26 the  total 
welfare loss of consumers and producers is close to €100 million. The response of domestic consumers to 
the vaccinated product has a significant impact on aggregate welfare: the difference of the average 
monetary impact of the MEDIUM with respect to the NONE vaccination scenario’s is €33 million.  
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3.4 Potential impact of channeling policies for vaccinated products 
Channeling policies represent a potential tool for alleviating the effects of foreign and domestic demand 
reactions to vaccinated products. These policies could have three potential effects: a positive effect on 
export demand (reduction in the export demand shock), a positive effect on the size of the trade ban 
(reduction in the number of countries which implement a trade ban) and potential ly a negative effect on 
domestic demand (vaccination demand shock) since vaccinated products are now allocated to the 
domestic market. Scenarios A-K in Table 7 represent different combinations of these potential effects. For 
these simulations, the following scenario variables were kept constant: strategy (RV3+1km), density 
(DPPA), size (MED) and domestic demand shock (DomDemMED). The reference scenario for comparison 
purposes is where the channeling policy is a set of compulsory measures including the restriction of live 
poultry originating from an MRZ to the domestic market, the restriction of vaccinated poultry to the 
domestic market and the restriction of products from poultry originating from an MRZ to the processed 
market (CompONLY).  Moreover in the reference case it is assumed that the vaccination demand shock is 
small, no third countries follow the EU and where the export demand shock is the same as domestic 
demand; the change in surplus measures for this scenario (scenario 27) are presented in Table 8. Scenario 
A represents a situation where the chosen channeling policy has no effect on either domestic demand, 
export demand or the trade ban. Scenario B represents a potential situation where the channeling policy 
leads to a smaller export demand shock; while scenario C leads to a lower trade ban. Scenario D 
represents a situation where the channeling policy has no effect on trading partner behaviour but leads to 
an increase in the domestic demand shock in response to vaccination. In scenario E both expo rt demand 
and the trade ban by third countries are positively influenced by the channeling policy; a similar situation 
is represented by scenario H but with channeling also leading to a larger domestic demand shock. Both 
scenarios F and G represent larger domestic demand shocks, accompanied by a reduction in the trade ban 
in scenario F and a reduction in the export demand shock in scenario G. Scenarios I and J represent 
situations where the reduction in the export demand shock is relatively large; in scenar io J this is 
accompanied by an increase in the domestic demand shock. Scenario K illustrates the effects of different 
channeling policies if there are no effects on demand and where the comparison scenario is scenario 2 (no 
demand shocks).  
Table 7. 
Specification of different scenarios for exploring the effects of channelling policies. 
 
 
The results for scenarios A-J presented in Table 8 show the effect of two different channeling strategies 
for vaccinated eggs in terms of their difference from the CompONLY policy (scenario 27). If the channeling 
policy has no effect on demand; then both producers and consumers gain marginally under the VacDOM 
policy (same as CompONLY with as an additional restriction that products from vaccinated poultry are 
Scenario ExpDem FollowEU Vac. Dem ExpDem FollowEU Vac. Dem 
A 0 0 0 SAME 0.00 SMA 
B + 0 0 UNDER 0.00 SMA 
C 0 + 0 SAME 0.33 SMA 
D 0 0 - SAME 0.00 MED 
E + + 0 UNDER 0.33 SMA 
F 0 + - SAME 0.33 MED 
G + 0 - UNDER 0.00 MED 
H + + - UNDER 0.33 MED 
I ++ 0 0 NONE 0.00 SMA 
J ++ 0 - NONE 0.00 MED 
K 0 0 0 NONE 0.00 NONE 
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restricted to the domestic market). while there is no difference under the VacPRO policy (VacPRO is the 
same as CompONLY with the additional restriction that products from vaccinated poultry are restricted t o 
the processed market). This suggests that for medium sized outbreaks in a DPPA, the domestic and 
processed markets are large enough to absorb the vaccinated eggs without too many disruptions. 
Scenarios B, C, E and I all represent situations where the channeling policy has a positive effect on export 
demand and/or the size of the trade ban. For these scenarios, aggregate producers are better off than 
compared to the situation where vaccinated eggs are not restricted. Consumers however are worse off 
under these scenarios with the exception of scenario C (channeling policy leads to a relaxed trade ban). 
Whether vaccinated eggs are restricted to the domestic market or the processed market makes little 
difference to the magnitude of the welfare effects. Packing stations are generally better off when eggs are 
allocated to the domestic market while layer farms are slightly better off when a processing policy is 
followed. Scenarios D, F, G, H and J all represent situations where the channelings policy leads to a la rger 
negative response from domestic consumers. In these situations, producers and consumers are both 
worse off than compared to the CompONLY policy.  Scenario J suggests that if the decrease in the export 
demand shock is large enough, this has the potential to offset the negative effects of the domestic 
demand shock. Whether the channeling policy effects export demand from EU partners or the size of the 
trade ban from third countries also impacts on welfare of producers and consumers. Layer and rearing 
farms are better off if the chosen policy affects export demand, while packing stations, parent farms and 
hatcheries are better off  if the policy affects the size of the trade ban.  
The results in Table 8 suggest that channeling eggs from vaccinated layers to the domestic or processed 
markets is a potentially attractive strategy (for medium sized epidemics) as long as this does not lead to a 
negative reaction by domestic consumers. In this sense, channeling these eggs to the processed market 
has the lowest chance of causing an additional reaction by domestic consumers. Although this is feasible 
for the simulated scenarios, the market disruptions are likely to be much larger for large epidemics.  
4 Discussion 
The current study aimed to analyze the impact, management and control of an external trigger hitting a 
complex food producing value chain. Occurrence of HPAI in a egg producing value chain causes a variety 
of technical (i.e. disease control) effects which go along with demand and supply shocks. These shocks  can 
be directly caused by the external trigger (e.g. disease control measures such as transport bans) or have a 
more autonomous nature (e.g. demand shocks caused by consumers). The practical focus was to (1) 
analyze the impact of important market factors on the market effects of HPAI outbreaks, and (2) derive 
policy guidelines to minimize these costs. In this discussion, first narrow issues regarding HPAI control in 
egg supply chains will be discussed. Thereafter, some more general insights will be present ed applicable in 
a broader area of value chain management. 
4.1 HPAI in egg value chains 
Overall results 
Results presented in this article indicate that not all stakeholders lose as a result of HPAI epidemics. The 
relative size of demand and supply shocks has important implications for which stakeholder groups gain or 
lose from epidemics. These relative shifts are most obvious when comparing epidemics in DPPAs and 
SPPAs. Consumers can gain in small epidemic situations, since any demand shifts generally domin ate the 
supply shifts leading to lower prices. The impact for consumers is also influenced by the nature of the 
demand shift, since consumer surplus is directly affected by shifts in domestic demand, but only indirectly 
affected by shifts in export demand. For the scenarios presented, producers as a whole always lose as a 
result of HPAI epidemics. Even for situations where the supply shifts dominated the demand shifts leading 
to situations of higher prices, the loss due to lower production dominated the benefits of higher prices. 
Although this holds true for producers as an aggregate, this disguises large differential effects between 
individual stakeholder groups.  
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Table 8. 
The effect on consumer and producer surplus of different channeling policies for different scenarios; change in percentage 
points from the base scenarios. 
Scenario  CS PS IND LAY PACK PAR REAR HAT 
27  -12.60  -14.86  -11.26  -7.10  -50.89  20.16  8.50  -59.76  
2  -16.50  -12.61  -10.41  32.73  -88.19  33.21  6.59  -50.14  
VacDOM          
A  0.37  0.02  -0.43  -2.10  3.97  0.05  -1.06  -0.37  
B  -1.07  1.97  -3.80  7.10  -1.99  0.38  1.78  0.81  
C  0.93  0.45  -3.69  -10.26  13.37  8.41  -0.72  11.91  
D  -4.17  -7.78  13.87  -28.79  5.79  2.92  -10.88  2.81  
E  -0.54  2.45  -7.08  0.44  7.19  9.06  2.50  12.29  
F  -3.39  -7.94  11.33  -37.48  14.74  13.56  -12.30  15.37  
G  -5.92  -1.89  3.00  -18.45  15.40  -0.42  -2.98  -0.81  
H  -5.35  -1.45  -0.27  -26.63  24.80  7.92  -2.62  11.49  
I  -3.48  2.27  0.43  36.94  -32.44  13.11  -2.98  9.27  
J  -9.49  0.39  3.58  32.64  -35.22  11.82  -4.10  8.48  
K  0.47  0.01  -0.40  -3.60  5.66  0.05  -1.08  -0.36  
VacPRO          
A  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
B  -1.50  1.94  -3.25  10.98  -6.51  0.42  2.88  1.17  
C  0.56  0.43  -3.26  -8.13  9.36  8.35  0.34  12.29  
D  -4.45  -7.69  14.05  -27.80  3.68  2.86  -9.82  3.16  
E  -0.96  2.41  -6.51  2.80  2.60  9.07  3.68  12.67  
F  -3.87  -7.16  11.01  -34.42  13.33  13.50  -11.24  15.74  
G  -6.11  -2.11  3.44  -18.84  13.39  -0.48  -1.93  -0.45  
H  -5.69  -1.49  0.16  -25.11  21.40  7.87  -1.57  11.87  
I  -3.85  2.15  1.06  39.61  -37.39  13.01  -2.05  9.51  
J  -9.60  0.14  4.03  30.88  -35.78  11.76  -3.04  8.83  
K  0.27  -0.48  0.99  -0.73  -0.84  -0.51  -0.57  -0.34  
Where CS = consumer surplus, PS = aggregate producer surplus, HAT= producer surplus for hatcheries, IND = producer 
surplus for egg product industry, LAY = producer surplus for layer farms, PACK = producer surplus for packing stations, PAR 
= producer surplus for parent farms, REAR = producer surplus for rearing farms.  
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The temporal pattern of changes in stocks and prices during the three epidemic phases is dependent on 
the distribution of culled and empty farms across the production chain. This makes it difficult to compare 
ex-ante different control strategies in terms of their market effects. A spatial epidemiological model which 
includes the structure of the poultry industry is necessary to be able to provide any insight into the 
distributive effects of epidemics. The price of eggs in particular appears to be sensitive to the distribution 
of affected farms.  
The results show, that aggregate welfare measures disguise the differential effects on individual 
stakeholder groups. The effects for individual farms will be even more diverse and crucially influenced by 
the timing of the production cycle for individual farms. Within each stakeholder group there will be very 
large winners and losers as a result of HPAI epidemics. If losses for individual farms  are sustained for a 
long period of time, which is often the case (results not shown), this will likely lead to situations where 
farms exit the industry (see also Gohin et al, 2013).  The current model does not account for the potential 
that farms will exit the industry. A gradual restocking programme may alleviate some of the extreme price 
fluctuations which lead to these differential effects but would also increase the length of time until pre -
epidemic capacity is reached.  
Region, trade bans and demand shocks 
The simulated welfare effects of large epidemics in a DPPA are particularly complex and difficult to 
interpret. For epidemics in a SPPA, lower trade bans are beneficial for producers but not for consumers. 
For epidemics in a DPPA, lower trade bans have little effect on aggregate producer and consumer surplus, 
while the effect on welfare of individual stakeholder groups widely vary and exhibits considerable 
nonlinearities. Trade bans differ from export demand shocks in that an export demand shock can t o some 
extent be compensated through lower prices; while a trade ban is a regulatory measure for which no 
compensatory mechanisms exist. The Dutch layer sector is heavily dependent on export demand from EU 
member states (exports account for 63 per cent of production, of which 91 per cent is exports to EU 
member states) and is therefore more sensitive to export demand shocks than trade bans. Germany is the 
most important export partner. Empirical evidence to date suggests that German consumers are likely to 
have a larger demand response than Dutch consumers. In this sense, the export demand shock where 
export demand reacts more strongly than domestic demand may be relatively more likely. 
Demand shocks have an strengthening impact on the changes in producers and consumers surplus. 
However, the additional impact, i.e. on top of the basic scenarios, is rather limited. Moreover,  the 
distribution of stakeholders who win or lose as a result of a HPAI epidemic generally remains the same as 
for scenarios where no demand shock occurs. The exception is for larger demand shocks. In these cases, 
layer farms and sometimes also rearing farms lose as a result of the epidemic.  
Channeling 
Channeling aims to reduce the negative impacts of the factors described above. T herefore, the potential 
of two channeling policies for restricting eggs from vaccinated layers to the domestic or processed market 
was explored. For medium sized epidemics in a DPPA, both the domestic and processed markets could 
absorb these quantities without major distortions. A channeling policy is an attractive option if this can 
lead to either a reduction in the export demand shock or a lower trade ban. However if such a policy leads 
to an increase in the vaccination demand shock then both consumers and producers are better off under a 
policy where these eggs are not channeled. Allocating eggs from vaccinated layers to the processed 
market may be less risky in terms of a domestic demand shock, but is also more restrictive which may 
cause problems if large quantities of eggs are involved.  
Management implications 
The results as a whole suggest some important factors which influence the market effects of HPAI 
epidemics: (1) location of epidemics in terms of farm density, expected size and length of epidemics, (2) 
production structure and degree of vertical integration and market  power at the different levels, (3) 
nature of and dependency on international trade in live poultry and eggs, in particular the level of intra -
EU trade versus inter-EU trade, and (4) the size of any processing or lower quality market and the 
potential of this market to absorb shocks. 
Experience with HPAI epidemics throughout the world appear to indicate that demand shocks are greater 
for poultry meat than for eggs. If this is the case, then the scenarios with either no or low demand shocks 
maybe more likely. It is unclear however whether any potential reaction to vaccinated products will be 
different between eggs and poultry meat.  
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In comparison to a market with only one product (i.e. only table eggs), the situation of a high and low 
quality product complicates the interpretation of market effects but also leads to opportunities to 
alleviate the effects of HPAI epidemics. The current assumption is that packing stations allocate eggs to 
the table and industrial markets. A more realistic approach would include the allocation of eggs to the 
export market; this is currently modelled independent of the decision on allocation of eggs.  
4.2 General insights for complex food value chains 
Most current days food value chains share quite some similarities with the egg supply chain used as 
subject for analysis in the current study, e.g. a multi-level and inter-linked structure, different processes 
along the chain, and an international embedment with im- and export. Moreover, they share a similar 
vulnerability for external triggers such as diseases and contaminations with toxic substances. Hence, some 
general insights obtained in the current study are valuable for these value chains as well, which will be 
discussed briefly below. 
First, there might occur a paradox between chain participants. Adverse external events can disrupt the 
value chain operation as a whole, being devastating for a large part of the chain participants, whereas at 
the same time temporary benefits might occur for some participants. Two factors play a role in this 
regard. First, if a certain chain level is affected relatively harder than others (e.g. breeding animals 
compared to production animals), a relative shortage of these breeding animals might be the result, 
provoking a price increase; those chain participants which are still in business will benefit from the latter. 
Second, between different chain levels differences in timing of production cycle will be the case (e.g. 
between production of breeding animals and production animals). Once the external trigger is gone (e.g. 
eradication of the disease), starting-up ‘slower’ production cycles might cause temporary relative 
shortages in supply provoking price increases and relative benefits to some participants. In this regard, 
the position in the value chain also might be important: a relative high position might imply some degree 
of independence, whereas participants down the value chain much more depend on others, with price 
risks as a result. 
Second, the international orientation of the value chain might be of importance. A high degree of export 
dependency implies that foreign customers have an important impact on possible demand shocks. I.e. 
their risk attitude and resulting purchase behavior plays an important role in the eventual price changes 
and consequently the economic impact. 
Third, channeling and building buffer stocks, aiming at (temporarily and artificially) reducing supply and 
price effects, might be an important temporary instrument in mitigation of the effects of supply and 
demand shocks. Unfortunately however, current value chains are focused on ‘just -in-time’ principles, 
thereby reducing potential (costing) buffer capacity as much as possible. Nevertheless, recent crises show 
that establishing a minimum buffer and channeling capacity offers appropriate instruments for risk 
management, particularly with regard to short-run price fluctuations. 
Fourth, and finally, some kind of collective management, synchronization or coordination during the 
starting-up phase after cessation/eradication of the external trigger (the so-called aftermath) might pay-
off. Lifting of restrictive measures is an important incentive for individual chain participants that were 
temporarily and/or partially out of business to speed-up their affairs. However, this might provoke a 
temporary, short but very high demand in e.g. raw materials (e.g. breeding animals) or inputs. Depending 
on the price elasticities and other market features, this can result in huge price increases of these 
commodities (which is beneficial for the suppliers but unfavorable for the buyers). A ‘synchronized’ 
starting-up has two advantages. First, purchasing prices will increase less, resulting in a reduced increase 
in production costs for the buyers. Second, selling of the first batch of end-product to the final consumers 
will have a lower peak, hence a sharp drop in producers’ price will be prevented. The combined effect is 
that the margins of final-product producers will be less affected. Hence, collective management should  
be aimed at a gradual and partial starting-up in the beginning, with less sharp price effects throughout the 
value chain as a result. 
4.3 Conclusions 
The main conclusions of this study are the following: 
− To our knowledge, this study provides the most comprehensive exploration of the potential effects of 
different shocks associated with contagious animal epidemics. In particular, modelling marketing 
restrictions on particular products as a result of animal disease epidemics is an addition to the literature; 
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− The indirect consequential costs found are substantial and large relative to the direct costs and direct 
consequential costs. This provides a strong argument to alongside veterinary considerations pay more 
attention to market impacts when determining an optimal HPAI disease control policy; 
− Our analysis shows that for a country with densely populated poultry areas when taking into account the 
indirect consequential costs (market effects) a disease control strategy including emergency vaccination 
can be more attractive than sticking to the standard non-vaccination cum pre-emptive culling strategy; 
− When combining vaccination strategies with egg channeling measures it appears possible to, under 
plausible demand side responses, substantially reduce the economic costs of an HPAI outbreak for 
aggregate producers as well as for society as a whole; 
− There exist large differential effects amongst different stakeholder groups along the supply chain as a 
result of an HPAI epidemic. The relative size of shifts in demand and supply has a major influence on the 
distribution of these effects. These differences are largest when comparing epidemics in DPPAs and SPPAs, 
but much smaller when comparing different control strategies for epidemics in a particular area; 
− The results suggest a number of important factors which influence the size and distribution of market 
effects as a consequence of HPAI epidemics. These include: (1) the location of epidemics in terms of farm 
density, expected size and length of epidemics, (2) the production structure (3) the nature of and 
dependency on international trade in live poultry and eggs, in particular the level of intra-EU trade versus 
inter-EU trade, and (4) the size of any processing or lower quality market and the potential of this market 
to absorb shocks; 
− The general insights provided by this study are also applicable to other highly integrated and complex food 
value chains. 
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